
A root-confined filesystem toolkit for MCP::Server.
Give a model a directory, not a machine. The pack registers ten tools — read, write, edit, list, glob, grep, stat, mkdir, move and delete — and every path argument they take is interpreted relative to a configured root that no argument can escape.
Synopsis
Plug it into a server you are building by hand:
use MCP::Server;
use MCP::Server::Tool::FileSystem;
my $server = MCP::Server.new(:name<workspace>, :version<1.0>);
$server.plug: MCP::Server::Tool::FileSystem.new(root => '/srv/notes');
# Registers fs_read, fs_write, fs_edit, fs_list, fs_glob, fs_grep,
# fs_stat, fs_mkdir, fs_move, fs_delete
$server.run; # stdin/stdout
Or name it in a one-shot server, with no use statement at all — the toolkit is loaded at runtime:
use MCP::Server;
MCP::Server.new(
:name<workspace>,
:tools[
'FileSystem' => { root => '/srv/notes', prefix => 'notes' },
'FileSystem' => { root => '/srv/logs', prefix => 'logs', 'read-only' => True },
],
).run;
# notes_read, notes_write, ... and logs_read, logs_list, logs_glob,
# logs_grep, logs_stat
Or skip the Raku entirely and hand raku-mcp a config file:
{
"name": "workspace",
"version": "1.0",
"instructions": "Notes are writable; logs are read-only.",
"tools": {
"FileSystem#notes": { "root": "/srv/notes", "prefix": "notes" },
"FileSystem#logs": { "root": "/srv/logs", "prefix": "logs", "read-only": true }
}
}
raku-mcp --config=workspace.json
# Or without a file:
raku-mcp --tool='FileSystem={"root":"/srv/notes"}'
# See what a given configuration would register:
raku-mcp --describe='FileSystem={"root":"/srv/notes"}'
In a Claude Code .mcp.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"notes": {
"command": "raku-mcp",
"args": ["--name=notes", "--tool=FileSystem={\"root\":\"/srv/notes\"}"]
}
}
}
Configuration
| Key | Type | Default | Meaning |
|---|
| root | IO::Path | required | Directory every path is resolved inside. A plain string is coerced. Must exist and be a directory, or construction dies. Stored resolved. |
| read-only | Bool | False | When True, the write, edit, mkdir, move and delete tools are never registered, and stat reports nothing as writable. |
prefix is reserved by the framework rather than the pack: pass it to .plug as :prefix<...>, or put it beside the toolkit's settings in a :tools entry or config file. Passing it to .new or .from-config dies. Without one, the pack's own default prefix fs applies; an explicit empty prefix registers bare names.
Names below are unprefixed. With the default prefix they are fs_read, fs_write and so on.
Parameter naming
Parameter names in this pack are a contract, not a matter of taste:
Every parameter that names a location is called exactly path, or from and to for the one tool that has two.
Multi-word parameters are kebab-case: old-string, new-string, replace-all, max-results.
The reason is what sits in front of the server. A permission layer — Claude Code's directory rules, or MCP::Client::Policy — decides whether a call may go through by looking at which files it would touch, and it finds them by name. A tool that called its argument filename would sail past a rule written for path. If you write a toolkit of your own that is meant to live behind the same guard, use the same names.
read(path, offset?, limit?)
Slurps a UTF-8 text file. Errors if the path is missing, is a directory, or is not decodable text.
{ "name": "fs_read", "arguments": { "path": "notes/todo.md" } }
=> "- buy milk\n- feed the yak\n"
With neither offset nor limit, what comes back is the file and nothing else: no numbering, no footer, no line-ending translation. That matters — the text is exactly what edit will be matching against later.
Pass offset (1-based) and/or limit to read a window of a long file instead. Ranged output is a view: each line is prefixed with its number and a tab, and a footer says where the window sits.
{ "name": "fs_read", "arguments": { "path": "log.txt", "offset": 40, "limit": 3 } }
=> "40\tconnecting
41\thandshake ok
42\tsending 12 frames
[lines 40-42 of 900 total]"
Strip the number and the tab before handing any of that text to edit as its old-string — the prefixes are not in the file. Windowed lines are split on line endings and rejoined with \n, so a CRLF file's \rs are not in the windowed output either: before building an old-string for a CRLF file, read it without offset/limit — the unranged form is byte-faithful.
Reading past the end is an answer rather than an error, because that is how a model finds out where the end is:
{ "name": "fs_read", "arguments": { "path": "log.txt", "offset": 5000 } }
=> "'log.txt' has 900 lines; offset 5000 is past the end"
An offset or limit below 1 is an error, as is a non-numeric one. A JSON true is refused rather than read as the number 1, which Raku's type system would otherwise let happen quietly.
write(path, content)
Writes UTF-8 text, replacing any existing contents, and confirms with a byte count. The parent directory must already exist — this tool never creates directories implicitly, so a typo in a path cannot quietly scatter new directory trees. Not registered when read-only is set.
{ "name": "fs_write", "arguments": { "path": "notes/todo.md", "content": "- done\n" } }
=> "Wrote 7 bytes to 'notes/todo.md'"
{ "name": "fs_write", "arguments": { "path": "new/todo.md", "content": "x" } }
=> isError: "Parent directory of 'new/todo.md' does not exist; create it with the mkdir tool first"
edit(path, old-string, new-string, replace-all = false)
Replaces one exact run of text and leaves the rest of the file byte for byte as it was. There is no fuzzy matching and no diff format to get wrong: old-string either appears in the file exactly — whitespace, indentation and line endings included — or the call is an error. Not registered when read-only is set.
{ "name": "fs_edit", "arguments": {
"path": "src/app.raku",
"old-string": "my $port = 8080;",
"new-string": "my $port = %*ENV<PORT> // 8080;" } }
=> "Replaced 1 occurrence in 'src/app.raku'; wrote 412 bytes"
The uniqueness rule is the whole safety story, so it is strict:
Zero matches is an error. Read the file first; the text you quote must be what is actually there.
More than one match is an error too, and the message says how many. Quote more of the surrounding lines until the match is unique, or set replace-all to true and mean it.
An empty old-string is refused: it is a position, not a match.
An old-string equal to new-string is refused: it would report success for having done nothing.
{ "name": "fs_edit", "arguments": {
"path": "src/app.raku", "old-string": "$port", "new-string": "$listen-port" } }
=> isError: "Found 6 occurrences of 'old-string' in 'src/app.raku'; quote more of
the surrounding text to pick one out, or set replace-all to true"
{ "name": "fs_edit", "arguments": {
"path": "src/app.raku", "old-string": "$port", "new-string": "$listen-port",
"replace-all": true } }
=> "Replaced 6 occurrences in 'src/app.raku'; wrote 431 bytes"
An empty new-string deletes the match. Line endings elsewhere in the file are never touched — see Security for why that takes deliberate effort in Raku.
list(path = '.')
One entry per line, sorted, directories marked with a trailing / on every platform. An empty directory answers (empty directory) rather than an empty string.
{ "name": "fs_list", "arguments": { "path": "notes" } }
=> "archive/\nideas.md\ntodo.md"
glob(pattern, path = '.')
Walks everything below path and returns matching paths relative to the root, sorted, one per line.
* matches any run of characters within one path segment.
? matches exactly one such character.
Everything else is literal, and matching is case-sensitive.
A pattern with no separator is matched against entry names at any depth; a pattern containing / is matched against the path relative to the searched directory.
Regexes are not accepted — .* means "a literal dot followed by anything", nothing more.
Symlinked directories are never descended into, so a glob cannot loop forever or report a file that lives outside the root.
{ "name": "fs_glob", "arguments": { "pattern": "*.md" } }
=> "notes/ideas.md\nnotes/todo.md"
{ "name": "fs_glob", "arguments": { "pattern": "notes/*.md" } }
=> "notes/ideas.md\nnotes/todo.md" # one segment deep only
{ "name": "fs_glob", "arguments": { "pattern": ".zzz" } }
=> "No matches for '.zzz' under '.'"
grep(pattern, path = '.', regex = false, glob?, context = 0, max-results = 50)
Searches the files below path — or path itself, if it names a file — and reports matching lines in GNU grep's format, path:line:text, with paths relative to the root.
{ "name": "fs_grep", "arguments": { "pattern": "TODO", "path": "src" } }
=> "src/app.raku:14:# TODO: retries
src/lib/db.raku:203:# TODO: index this"
By default the pattern is literal text: no escaping, no surprises, . is a full stop. Set regex to true and it becomes a Raku regex, not a PCRE one. Classes, quantifiers, alternation, anchors and captures read the same; what differs is worth knowing before reaching for it:
Whitespace in the pattern is insignificant. foo bar matches foobar; write foo ' ' bar or foo \s bar for a literal space.
\d, \w, \s and . work; [abc] is not a character class in Raku — that is <[abc]>, and [...] is a non-capturing group.
A pattern containing { } is refused outright rather than run. See Security.
An unparseable pattern is reported as an error before any file is opened, not halfway through the tree.
{ "name": "fs_grep", "arguments": { "pattern": "^ sub \w+", "regex": true, "glob": "*.rakumod" } }
=> "lib/Thing.rakumod:12:sub parse-header(...)
lib/Thing.rakumod:44:sub emit(...)"
{ "name": "fs_grep", "arguments": { "pattern": "a(b", "regex": true } }
=> isError: "Invalid regex pattern 'a(b': Unable to parse expression ..."
The rest of the parameters bound what comes back:
glob filters by file name only, using the same matcher as the glob tool, at any depth. A / in it is refused — filter names with glob, choose where to look with path.
context (0 to 20) shows surrounding lines, marked with - instead of : so they cannot be mistaken for matches, and separates non-adjacent groups with --.
max-results (1 to 1000, default 50) stops the search after that many matching lines and says so. Files are visited in sorted order, so a truncated result is the same result every time.
Files that are not UTF-8 text — a NUL byte in the first 8KB, or bytes that will not decode — are skipped, and a trailing notice counts them.
{ "name": "fs_grep", "arguments": { "pattern": "yak", "context": 1 } }
=> "notes/todo.md-3-shopping:
notes/todo.md:4:- feed the yak
notes/todo.md-5-- water the yak
--
notes/todo.md-11-later:
notes/todo.md:12:- rename the yak"
{ "name": "fs_grep", "arguments": { "pattern": "the", "max-results": 2 } }
=> "notes/ideas.md:1:the first
notes/ideas.md:7:the second
[stopped at 2 matching lines; raise max-results to see more]"
grep is a reading tool: it is registered even when read-only is set.
stat(path)
{ "name": "fs_stat", "arguments": { "path": "notes/todo.md" } }
=> "path: notes/todo.md
type: file
size: 26
modified: 2026-07-29T20:14:02Z
symlink: no
readable: yes
writable: yes"
type is file, directory or other; modified is ISO 8601 in UTC; writable is always no on a read-only pack, whatever the mode bits say, because no tool in that configuration can write.
mkdir(path)
Creates a directory and any missing parents. Creating one that already exists is a no-op, not an error, so a model retrying itself does not get punished. Not registered when read-only is set.
{ "name": "fs_mkdir", "arguments": { "path": "notes/archive/2026" } }
=> "Created directory 'notes/archive/2026'"
move(from, to)
Renames a file or directory, or moves it somewhere else inside the root. Both from and to go through the same containment checks, so neither end can leave the sandbox. A directory moves with everything inside it. Not registered when read-only is set.
{ "name": "fs_move", "arguments": { "from": "notes/todo.md", "to": "notes/archive/todo.md" } }
=> "Moved 'notes/todo.md' to 'notes/archive/todo.md'"
Nothing is ever overwritten and nothing is created implicitly:
An existing to — file or directory — is an error. Delete it first if that is really what you meant.
A to whose parent directory does not exist is an error, exactly as with write. Use mkdir first.
Moving the root itself is refused.
There is no copy-and-delete fallback across filesystems: the move is a rename, and a rename that the OS refuses (a to on a different mount, say) is reported as the error it is rather than half-performed. See Security.
delete(path, recursive = false)
Deletes a file, or a directory that is empty. Not registered when read-only is set.
{ "name": "fs_delete", "arguments": { "path": "notes/scratch.md" } }
=> "Deleted file 'notes/scratch.md'"
{ "name": "fs_delete", "arguments": { "path": "notes/empty" } }
=> "Deleted empty directory 'notes/empty'"
{ "name": "fs_delete", "arguments": { "path": "notes/archive" } }
=> isError: "Directory 'notes/archive' is not empty; set recursive to true to
delete it and everything below it"
recursive is rm -rf and nothing less: the directory and every file below it go, with no undo and no confirmation step.
{ "name": "fs_delete", "arguments": { "path": "notes/archive", "recursive": true } }
=> "Deleted directory 'notes/archive' and everything below it"
Symlinks are deleted as the links they are, never followed — a recursive delete of a directory containing a link to somewhere else removes the link and leaves its target alone. Deleting the root itself is refused.
Errors
Handlers throw; the framework turns that into a tool result with isError: true and the message as its text, so the model sees what went wrong and can correct itself. Missing or non-string arguments are reported the same way — the MCP input schema advertises what is required, but nothing in the protocol enforces it.
Security
Confinement is the whole point of this pack, so it is done in layers that each hold on their own. For a path argument $rel:
Relative only. Anything that could be absolute is rejected textually, before any filesystem call: a leading / or \, a X: drive prefix, or a \\server\share UNC prefix.
No .. at all. .. segments are refused even when the result would have stayed inside the root (a/../b is an error, not a synonym for b). One rule is easier to audit than an arithmetic one.
No device names. Segments Windows resolves to devices regardless of directory — CON, PRN, AUX, NUL, COM1..COM9, LPT1..LPT9, with or without an extension — are refused on every platform, so behaviour is identical everywhere rather than only safe where it is tested.
No null bytes.
Physical-path symlink chase. The candidate path is built segment by segment under the root; then every symlink in it is chased to its destination — component by component, the way realpath works, with a hop budget against cycles — and the physical result is checked against the root. A symlink planted inside the sandbox therefore cannot be used as a door out of it, whether it points at a file or a directory, whether directly or through a chain, and whether its target is absolute or relative. The chase is the pack's own (over readlink), not IO::Path.resolve, because .resolve does not follow symlinks on Windows — an unfollowed link is an open door the OS walks through at open time even though a check did not. One code path runs on every platform. A link whose target cannot be read, a chain that exceeds the hop budget, and a Windows drive-relative target (C:foo) are all refused outright: fail closed.
Parent-chain containment, not string prefixes. The final check walks .parent from the chased path up to the filesystem root looking for the root itself. /srv/root2 is not inside /srv/root, and no separator-spelling difference can fake a match — on Windows both slash spellings are unified before comparing.
The textual rejections are deliberately redundant with the physical check: two independent layers fail independently, and they make the failure message say what the model did wrong.
Comparison is exact-case. On a case-insensitive filesystem, a root configured with different casing than the path the OS reports can only produce a false negative — access denied — never a false positive. It fails closed.
Byte fidelity, and why CRLF is a security property
read and edit never see a decoded-and-re-encoded copy of your file: they read bytes and decode them once, and edit writes bytes back.
This is deliberate, and it took work. Raku's IO::Path.slurp in text mode silently folds CRLF into LF, and .spurt does not put it back. An edit that round-tripped through the text path would therefore rewrite the line endings of every line in the file it did not touch — a one-line change arriving as a whole-file diff. On a CRLF checkout that is not a cosmetic problem: it is an invisible, unreviewable change to code, made by a tool the reviewer trusts to change one line.
So the guarantee is: edit changes the bytes you asked it to change and no others, and the text read hands back is what edit will be matching against, byte for byte. The cost is that an old-string copied out of a CRLF file must carry its CRLF; the alternative was silent corruption.
Regex interpolation
grep's regex mode interpolates the client's pattern into a real Raku regex (/<$pattern>/). That is only safe because Rakudo refuses, by default, to interpolate a pattern containing a code block — a pattern like { unlink 'x' } is rejected with Prohibited regex interpolation rather than executed. The refusal comes back to the model as an ordinary tool error.
Never add use MONKEY-SEE-NO-EVAL to this file. That pragma exists to turn exactly this guard off, and turning it off here converts a search tool into remote code execution. The module carries a comment saying so, and t/02-tools.rakutest asserts that an injection pattern comes back as a clean error — that test is the guard on the guard.
Malformed patterns are validated before the walk starts, so a bad pattern costs one clear error rather than a partial traversal.
Residual risks worth knowing:
A symlink already inside the root that points within the root is followed, by design. If you populate the sandbox from an untrusted source, populate it without symlinks.
On a platform whose resolve does not fully canonicalise (older Windows), a pre-planted in-root symlink pointing outside could in principle survive the ancestor check. The ../absolute/device rejections still hold; treat the root as a directory you control the contents of.
Confinement is not a permission system. Anything the server process can read under the root, the model can read, and on a read-write pack anything it can write, the model can delete. Run it as a user with no more access than you intend to grant, use read-only unless writes are actually wanted, and put a permission layer in front of it if "the whole root" is more than you meant to hand over.
delete with recursive is rm -rf, applied to a path the model chose. It refuses the root itself and it unlinks symlinks rather than following them, but within the root it is exactly as final as it sounds. This is the tool to gate behind a permission layer first.
move is a rename and only a rename. If the root spans a mount point — a bind mount, a network share grafted into the tree — a move across it fails with the OS's own error instead of silently copying and deleting. Honest, but it means such a move is simply not available; do it with read and write if you must.
Nothing here rate-limits or size-limits: read will happily slurp a huge file into memory, glob will walk a huge tree, and grep reads every text file below the path it is given (max-results bounds the output, not the reading). Point it at a workspace, not at /.
Testing
prove6 -Ilib t/ # with MCP::Server installed
prove6 -Ilib -I../MCP-Server/lib t/ # against a sibling checkout
t/03-containment.rakutest is the file to read first if you change the resolver: it drives every escape attempt through real tool calls, including symlink escapes, and adapts rather than skips on hosts where creating a symlink is not permitted.
Examples
examples/filesystem-server.raku — a two-root server (writable workspace, read-only reference tree) over stdio.
Author
Matt Doughty
License
Artistic-2.0